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THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION/QUOTA ISSUE: BACK TO
THE FUTURE IN THE YEAR 2000? (THE BEN J.
ALTHEIMER LECTURE)*
James E. Jones, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Periodically, for more than twenty years academic debate and de-
bate in the media has been dominated by the affirmative action or
quota issue. Although affirmative action as a remedial concept is as old
as equity, and it has been part and parcel of remedial power in labor
legislation since at least the early 1930s,1 the "modern" debate did not
emerge until late 1969 or early 1970.2 The principal triggering event
was the issuance by the U.S. Department of Labor, pursuant to Execu-
tive Order 11246, of the revised Philadelphia Plan establishing certain
goals and timetables for jobs on federally assisted construction in the
Philadelphia area.' Although the affirmative action obligation had been
a requirement of government contractors since 1961, it was largely
ignored.
Subsequently, the Department of Labor made concepts embodied
in the Philadelphia Plan applicable to all contractors doing business
with the federal government. This effort became a focal point of vigor-
ous debate in 1971 leading up to the revisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which deals with employment. After lengthy de-
* Delivered at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law on November 19,
1992. The following piece is a manuscript of the lecture itself rather than the more traditional
adaptation in article format.
** Nathan P. Feinsinger, Professor of Labor Law and Professor of Industrial Relations,
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, Wisconsin.
I. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
2. See, e.g., James E. Jones Jr., The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REV.
341; Robert P. Schuwerk, Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Execu-
tive Power, 39 U. CI. L. REV. 723 (1972); Prof. Hill has listed some of the vast body of comment
on the subject expressing views both pro & con in "'Herbert Hill, Race and Ethnicity in Organ-
ized Labor: The Historical Sources of Resistance to Affirmative Action, 12 J. INTERGROUP REL. 5
(1984).' "
3. That executive order, which in substance remains in effect today, wag issued by then
President Lyndon Johnson. It was a revision of two previous orders which had been issued by
President John F. Kennedy in 1961.
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bate over the constitutionality and legality of the Department of La-
bor's affirmative action requirement, Congress rejected a proposal to
ban it and enacted a provision into law which made clear its acceptance
of the fundamental concepts.4 Despite what seemed decisive action by
Congress, or perhaps because of it, the controversy over the legality of
affirmative action, epitomized by the concept of goals and timetables,
continued to fuel the debate over "quotas."'
Affirmative action took on a larger meaning beyond the arena of
employment, particularly in admissions to professional schools. Any
program, public or private actions which provided or sought to provide
opportunities or other benefits to persons on the basis of, among other
things, their membership in a specified group or groups, brought forth
the attack that they were preferential treatment and reverse discrimi-
nation. They were quotas and, therefore, immoral, illegal, and uncon-
stitutional. For more than twenty years now these arguments have con-
tinued, fueled each season by a new factual pattern.
In 1989, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,5 the Supreme
Court invalidated the city's program requiring a percentage set-aside of
city contracts or subcontracts for minorities or women. Also in 1989,
the Supreme Court issued a series of cases which narrowly interpreted
the employment discrimination protections in federal laws, particularly
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.6 The
cases of 1989-90 so drastically revised interpretations of the existing
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982) provides:
SEC. 718. No Government contract, or portion thereof, with any employer, shall be
denied, withheld, terminated, or suspended, by any agency or officer of the United
States under any equal employment opportunity law or order, where such employer has
an affirmative action plan which has previously been accepted by the Government for
the same facility within the past twelve months without first according such employer
full hearing and adjudication under the provisions of title 5, United States Code, sec-
tion 554, and the following pertinent sections: Provided, That if such employer has
deviated substantially from such previously agreed to affirmative action plan, this sec-
tion shall not apply: Provided further, That for the purposes of this section an affirma-
tive action plan shall be deemed to have been accepted by the Government of the time
the appropriate compliance agency has accepted such plan unless within forty-five days
thereafter the Office of Federal Contract Compliance has disapproved such plan.
5. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is a reconstruction era civil rights statute. In a series of cases beginning
in 1968, the Supreme Court had resuscitated its applicability to employment discrimination. Cf.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,
481 U.S. 615 (1987); St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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statutes that Congress was motivated in 1990 to pass a bill reversing all
of them. Congress also provided additional relief to classes of persons
protected by these civil rights laws. Despite the lack of a shred of credi-
ble evidence linking quotas to interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the fact that the 1990 Civil Rights Bill passed Congress by a
larger margin than the action authorizing Desert Storm, President
Bush vetoed the Bill. The effort to override the veto in the Senate failed
by only one vote.
David Duke, an allegedly reformed leader of the Ku Klux Klan
who had been elected to the Senate of the State of Louisiana after a
racially divisive campaign, was in attendance in the gallery of the Sen-
ate at the vote to override. He claimed that the results indicated that
the nation and Congress had received his message. Senator Jesse
Helms, in such political difficulty as to be an underdog in his re-elec-
tion bid in the State of North Carolina that year, utilized the quota
issue in a negative campaign which was credited with defeating his
challenger Harvey Gant, a black Democrat. The word was put out that
the quota issue was a hot one for the upcoming 1992 presidential
campaign.
The focus of these attacks rests on the unstated premise that the
executive order of the President and the action of the Congress in pass-
ing civil rights legislation were primarily for the benefit of blacks. The
general population, which receives most of its information (it seems)
from television, seemed unaware of the scope of the protections of these
civil rights laws. Not only is discrimination on the basis of race and
color prohibited, but also discrimination on the basis of sex, religion,
ancestry, and national origin. Everyone has a race, color and sex. Most
fit, or will fit, in other protected classes, such as age or handicap. The
Civil Rights Bill was vigorously attacked by its opponents, and the jus-
tification given by the President for his veto was that the requirements
of the law would lead to the adoption by employers of quotas. The
requirement at issue had been in the law since its inception in 1964. It
related to the use of tests and other neutral procedures which have a
disparate impact on a protected class when the employer cannot prove
that the test is related to ability to do the job. In Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust,7 the Supreme Court made clear that the standard was
applicable to subjective criteria primarily used in upper level jobs, such
as managerial and executive. Because of the educational advances
7. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
1993]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
made in the last twenty years by women, the overwhelming majority of
the jobs which would be at issue in subjective criteria cases are those in
which a larger portion of highly educated white females would be af-
fected. In addition, improvements made in the law with regard to dam-
ages for harassment benefit mostly women who are subject to sexual
harassment. These laws provide protection for virtually the entire U.S.
workforce - the majority of which is still white.
After some cosmetic changes, negotiated primarily between Sena-
tor John Danforth of Missouri and Senator Edward Kennedy of Massa-
chusetts, the Bill was passed yet again. Although the offensive language
allegedly resulting in quotas remained substantially unchanged, the
President declared victory and signed the Bill. These are brief accounts
of affirmative action quota debates of 1989-91.
In 1992, suddenly, there is a strange absence from the scene domi-
nated again by shrill thirty second sound bites, frequently negative and
dirty, of references to affirmative action. At the conventions--or at
least television coverage of them-I only remember hearing the term
once (I think) from the Democratic nominees and not at all from Vice-
President Quayle or President Bush. President Bush, in his acceptance
speech, referred to the quota issue, but only to boast of vetoing the
1990 Civil Rights Bill and forcing Congress to send him one that did
not require quotas.
The latest "splash" in the legal academic area was last year's Re-
flections of an Affirmative Action Baby' by Professor Stephen Carter
of Yale Law School. Professor Carter, a young black (or African
American which seems to be the term of choice this year), is a pro-
fessed liberal unlike Thomas Sowell, 9 a black conservative economist,
and Justice Clarence Thomas. He has received "tons of ink" because of
his criticism and rejection of affirmative action, as did Sowell and
Thomas in years past. We found eight cases at the appeals court level,
including cases on contract set-asides or race specific scholarships. 10 As
8. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1984). See also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson: The Backlash Against Affirmative Ac-
tion, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1609 (1990); Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 1267 (1992).
9. THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, (1st ed.
1990).
10. See Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 1273 (Ist Cir. 1992); Billish v. City of Chicago,
962 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1992); Ellis v. Skinner, 961 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. City of
Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992); Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992); Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associ-
[Vol. 15:361
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I reviewed it in preparation for this speech, there were three cases on
the Supreme Court's docket this year which raised the affirmative ac-
tion or quota issue. Before I arrived here, however, the Supreme Court
denied review in all of them.11 Maybe the debate is over, affirmative
action is dead, and I failed to note its passing, or maybe the conflict
went underground in the wake of the Los Angeles riots and Hurricane
Andrew. But, I think not.12
What I do know is that the fundamental problem of underutiliza-
tion of women, blacks, and other people of color in the workforce has
not gone away and that the statistics of disparity on all the social in-
dicators of well-being continue to disfavor these groups.
Now more than ever we need to assure the availability of affirma-
tive action programs to address these current and future problems. And
while this messenger is tired, it is still necessary to deliver the message
to our future leaders who must solve these problems or face the conse-
quences of a past generation's failure to resolve them.
While the recent national debates focused on mindless arguments
about the existence or nonexistence of quota provisions in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the implications of a study by the Hudson Institute
commissioned by the U.S. Labor Department on Workforce 2000 were
largely ignored. The study issued in 1987 was entitled Workforce 2000:
Work and Workers for the Twenty-First Century.13 The Hudson Insti-
tute is a conservative think-tank. This study was commissioned by the
Reagan Administration. What it shows is that by the year 2000 only
fifteen percent of the net new workers will be white males. Forty-two
percent of the net new workers will be women, seven percent will be
native nonwhite men, and thirteen percent will be native nonwhite
women. The other twenty-two percent is expected to be immigrant men
and women. Other demographics reveal that the population in the
workforce will grow more slowly than at any time since the 1930s, the
average age of the workforce will rise, and the pool of young workers
ated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217 (11 th Cir. 1992); O'Donnel Con-
struction Co. v District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
I1. See Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992); Jacobson v. Cincinnati
Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257 (1992); Ellis v.
Skinner, 961 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3301 Oct. 1992, sub. nom.
Ellis v. Card.
12. See generally Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. REV.
1267 (1992).
13. WILLIAM B. JOHNSTON & ARNOLD E. PACKER, HUDSON INSTITUTE, WORKFORCE 2000:
WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1987).
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entering the labor market will shrink. More women will enter into the
workforce, minorities will be the largest share of new entrants into the
labor force, and immigrants will represent the largest share of the in-
crease since the first World War. Between now and the year 2000, mi-
norities will make up twenty-nine percent of the workforce.
Of the six policy issues the Hudson Institute suggested deserved
attention, three relate to activities which are in tension with anti-af-
firmative action initiatives. Important suggested initiatives involved im-
proving the dynamism of an aging workforce; reconciling the demands
of women, work, and family; integrating blacks and Hispanics fully
into the workforce; and improving workers' education and skills.
We have recently seen the successful enactment of protections
available for older workers. We also saw the passage of a revolutionary
bill protecting the rights of the disabled. The effectiveness of that law
was delayed for two years, but it went into effect fully July 26, 1992.
In view of this seeming recognition by the government that effective
protections for the aged and the disabled to participate in the world of
work are needed, attacks on equal employment for the rest of society,
misfocused as it has been on the black issue, are doubly disturbing.
The majority of the key items which the Workforce 2000 study
identified as critical to a healthy economy are directly threatened by
the attacks on affirmative action and equal employment. A follow-up
study on Workforce 2000, Competing in a Sellers Market: Is Corpo-
rate America Prepared, was a survey prepared by the Hudson Institute
and Towers Perrin, an internationally' known management consulting
firm. This study suggested that the Workforce 2000 phrase would be
more apt if we talked about Workforce 1990. Many employers in the
survey group were strugglifig with the implications of recruiting and
managing a workforce composed less and less of white males. Minori-
ties already comprise from twenty to twenty-six percent of the compa-
nies surveyed, and such companies are already concerned about cul-
tural diversity. Although they are aware of the needs of female
employees, relatively few of these companies reported any concern
about the aging of their workforce. In response to demographic shifts,
many companies were formulating new approaches, exploring different
ways to structure the work day or week, and to manage diversity, and
employing sophisticated recruitment and training tactics to address the
gaps in skills.
In a Business Week report of a survey of 404 senior executives at
[Vol. 15:361366
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corporations drawn from the Business Week 1000,1' corporate execu-
tives insisted they did not need anyone twisting their arms to hire more
women and minorities. Sixty-five percent of those polled insisted that
business will open up its hiring and promotion practices without affirm-
ative action laws. That may be because corporate America feels that
the marketplace is already forcing companies to end discrimination in
employment. Executives point to the shifting composition of the labor
supply and the benefits of a diverse workforce as bigger spurs to affirm-
ative action than fears of government or private lawsuit. Even so, more
than half say their companies need to do a better job of hiring minori-
ties, and forty-four percent are unsatisfied with their progress in hiring
women. Another weakness is failure to promote women and minorities
into top management. 15
It does not take a genius to realize that with demographic shifts in
the offing and the increasing need for skilled and well-trained workers
in order to operate our complicated society in the future, what we need
are programs that promote the utilization of all of our diverse human
resources. What we are getting is the chilling of affirmative action by
the posturing of the government and the weakening of the laws that
keep the momentum going at the time when our best projections of our
future needs dictate just the opposite behavior. Despite the assertion of
some corporate executives that the market will take care of the prob-
lem, the facts are that until affirmative action came on stream in the
late 1960s, there was no indication that the market was responsive.
Granted the demographics were not the same, but minorities and
women who were qualified and available were being wasted except in
times of war and critical shortages of labor.
Needed now, perhaps even more, are government efforts to im-
prove the education and training of minorities. Females seem to be do-
ing rather well on the education and training level in many areas, de-
spite less than parity in job penetration in the various activities
heretofore considered nontraditional. High student loans adversely af-
fect the job choices of even the best students. Government cuts in fi-
14. Race in the Work Place: Is Affirmative Action Working?, BUSINESS WEEK. July 8, 1991
at 50-63.
15. Congress seems to have taken note of this last problem with the vigorous support of the
Bush Administration. The 1991 Civil Rights Act which was passed and signed by the President
has a whole separate section on the glass ceiling problem particularly focused on women and
affirmative action efforts to penetrate the glass ceiling, an initiative which seems strangely at odds
with the persistent vocalization of opposition to affirmative action which involves numbers.
1993]
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nancial aid, government attacks on minority scholarships, government
support for the ending of desegregation orders even though schools re-
main segregated by race (and some even by sex) - all go counter to
the needs documented in Workforce 2000 and other such demographic
analyses.
It is clear that individuals without skills cannot do jobs even if
they get one. Without education they cannot be trained for high-tech
jobs. The major initiative of government seems to be pushing for the
building of more jails to house increasing majorities of nonwhite in-
mates and to provide them with mind-dulling tasks and longer jail
terms. It takes more money to keep an inmate in a cell for a year than
to send one to Harvard. At least, we should take the schools to prison-
ers and perhaps, consider a requirement of a meaningful educational or
training plateau as a condition for release.
That study of Workforce 200016 noted that the surveyed employers
were literally in the midst of a sea of change. The average workforce of
the companies in the study is already one-half female. Minorities now
compose up to twenty percent of the workforce at just under sixty per-
cent of the companies and more than twenty-six percent of the employ-
ees at almost one-fourth of the companies surveyed, Most of the em-
ployers were aware of and concerned about their demographic destiny,
cultural diversity being the paramount concern, with just under three-
quarters noting some level of management focus on the hiring and pro-
motion of minority employees. Sixty-eight percent expressed concern
about the special needs of female employees, but only a relatively few
were concerned about the aging of the workforce, even though employ-
ees over the age of forty made up thirty-five percent on average of the
workforces of the companies surveyed.
The Towers Perrin survey report closed with this telling
declaration:
A Strategic Focus. Demographic realities are bringing human re-
source issues to the forefront of management consciousness. That
seems clear from the high levels of management concern reported by
our respondents. And there is a growing recognition that the changes
require a new style of management, one that places as much strategic
emphasis on human resources as it does on financial or other
resources.
1 7
16. TOWERS PERRIN, HUDSON INSTITUTE. WORKFORCE 2000: COMPETING IN A SELLER'S
MARKET: IS CORPORATE AMERICA PREPARED? (1990).
17. Id. at 19.
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As a clear indication of the impact of recent demographic realities,
most employers are now referring to what used to be the personnel de-
partments as human resources management. Indeed, many business
schools throughout the country have changed the label to reflect the
human resources emphasis, and professional associations so labeled
have begun to emerge.
These employers will be the major clients of the law firms you
hope to join or form. What will or should be the role of law and the
lawyers in a transition period where corporate management has finally
recognized that human resources are as important as financial or other
resources?
II. IF DEMOGRAPHICS ARE DESTINY, THE EMERGING
JURISPRUDENCE ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS ON A COLLISION
COURSE WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF WORKFORCE 2000
George Santayana said, "Progress, far from consisting of change,
depends upon retentiveness. . . . Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to fulfill it.""8 If one wishes to find an example of this
aphorism, one only needs examine closely the modern debates over af-
firmative action and then look back at the debates surrounding the pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with the efforts of
Congress to provide targeted aid for the newly emancipated slaves.
It is useful to keep in mind that affirmative action, particularly in
employment, has been constitutionally tested and generally upheld in
two contexts in the last two decades. The first context involves court
orders or remedy after adjudication of the issue of discrimination or
after the parties consent to a decree. A remedy so crafted might re-
quire the defendant to grant particular benefits to identified victims of
discrimination operating retroactively. It might also require certain
race specific conduct for nonidentified victims that would operate pro-
spectively. Thus, an offending employer may be required to adopt an
affirmative action hiring plan for future job openings or a plan for fu-
ture promotions.
The second context involves programs that an appropriate public
authority has legislatively or administratively determined to be
necessary.1 9
l8. GEORGE SANTAYANA. LIFE OF REASON, vol. i, ch. XII, Flux and Constancy in Human
Nature. (1905-06) quoted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (1979).
19. The First Circuit Court of Appeals discusses this succinctly in Associated Gen. Contrac-
1993] 369
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A. Affirmative Action as Program in the Supreme Court
As one scholar points out,
While the scholarship includes vigorous debate and disagreement over
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment the one point on which his-
torians of the Fourteenth Amendment agree, and, indeed, which the
evidence places beyond cavil, is that [it] was designed to place the
constitutionality of the Freedman's Bureau and civil rights bills, par-
ticularly the latter, beyond doubt. . . . The doubt related to the ca-
pacity of the Thirteenth Amendment to sustain this far-reaching legis-
lative program.20
Over the past two decades, the scholarly community has been mired in
ideological and philosophical dialogue contributing little to the resolu-
tion of the real problems which we face.
Except to deny review of numerous employment cases, the United
States Supreme Court did not enter the debate until DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard,21 a law school admission case that the Supreme Court accepted
for review and then dismissed as moot. Justice Douglas dissented in
DeFunis and, in the guise of a dissent, wrote a raging argument as to
why benign race-based programs were unconstitutional. It was not until
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2 that the Court ad-
dressed the substantive question of benign programs requiring classifi-
cation by race. That case added fuel to the fire and inundated us with
advocacy, but provided neither enlightenment nor resolution. The deci-
sion has been referred to as a four-one-four decision, and even today,
the Supreme Court has provided less than satisfactory jurisprudential
guidance with regard to affirmative action programs. 3 The opinion in
the Bakke case which garnered the most attention was written by Jus-
tice Powell, who agreed that it was not per se unconstitutional to use
race in affirmative action programs when the programs were appropri-
ately crafted. However, he concluded that the particular program of-
fended the law. The issue was a quota consisting of a number of places
tors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
20. JUDITH A. BAER. EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1983); JACOBUS TENBROEK.
EQUAL UNDER LAW 201 (rev. ed. 1965); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). See also Note, The Thir-
teenth Amendment and Private Affirmative Action, 89 YALE L.J. 399 (1979).
21. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
22. 438 U.S. 265 (1968).
23. For a discussion of some of these ideas, see James E. Jones, Jr., The Origins of Affirma-
tive Action 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 383 (1988).
370 [Vol. 15:361
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in a medical school admission program reserved exclusively for non-
whites. However, nonwhites could also compete with whites for the
other open positions.
In the next case, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,2" the
Supreme Court approved an affirmative action program over the pro-
test of a white male employee who alleged reverse discrimination. The
company and the union had voluntarily entered into the program
through collective bargaining to correct what they perceived to be a
manifest imbalance in the participation of their black employees in bet-
ter jobs. The plaintiff's claim of reverse discrimination under Title VII
was rejected by the Court, which held that the Act did not prohibit
voluntary action by parties to correct past discrimination by utilizing a
program that provided for one-to-one black or white participation. The
program did not involve layoffs, but rather involved opportunities for
participation in a training program that the parties had established.
The Court did not address the constitutional issue, but it did provide
standards which affirmative action programs should follow to avoid un-
necessarily trammeling the rights of innocent workers.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,2 5 the Supreme Court examined a pro-
gram, attacked as an unconstitutional quota, which Congress had es-
tablished to provide for a ten percent set-aside of certain federal con-
tracts for minority contractors. Congress had acted because a long-
standing program established by the President under executive order
had proved ineffective. The Court sustained the constitutionality of this
set-aside program by a six to three vote, though the multiplicity of
opinions failed to provide us with any dependable jurisprudence.
Still later in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,2 the Su-
preme Court addressed an issue left open in Weber regarding voluntary
adoption of affirmative action plans by public employers. The city and
its union had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that not
only provided for affirmative action in hiring, but protected minority
teachers from layoffs. A majority of the Court concluded that the lay-
off provision was unconstitutional because it was not sufficiently nar-
rowly tailored and it maintained levels of minority hiring that had no
relation to remedying past employment discrimination. Here again,
there was a multiplicity of opinions creating more confusion than con-
24. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
25. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
26. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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sensus. The Court did seem to support the conclusion that a public em-
ployer, consistent with the Constitution, may undertake an affirmative
action program which is designed to further a legitimate remedial pur-
pose and which implements that purpose by means that do not impose
disproportionate harm on the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the
rights, of innocent individuals. However, its opinion raised the confus-
ing question of the factual predicate necessary to support such action.
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,27 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of voluntary affirmative action by a state entity chal-
lenged as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
Weber the actors were a private company and its trade union. In John-
son v. Transportation Agency, a state had established an affirmative
action program which was challenged by Johnson, who had claimed he
was denied a promotion because of his sex. The promotion was granted
to a woman under the agency's unilateral voluntary affirmative action
plan. The plan did not set quotas in any job classification, but estab-
lished a long-range goal to attain a workforce whose composition in all
major job classifications approximated the distribution of women and
minorities and handicapped persons in the county labor market. The
plan specified no past discriminatory practices, but merely stated that
women had been traditionally underrepresented in the relevant job
classification. No woman held any of the agency's 238 skill craft posi-
tions. The Supreme Court sustained the county's plan, applying the
standards it had enunciated in Weber. The Court found that it was
plainly reasonable for the agency to consider sex as one factor in mak-
ing its decision. The plaintiff did not raise any constitutional issues.
Justice Scalia thundered in dissent that this case was worse than
Weber and that a statute designed to establish a color-blind and gen-
der-blind workplace had been converted into a powerful engine of ra-
cism and sexism, not merely permitting intentional race and sex dis-
crimination, but often making it, through operation of the legal system,
practically compelled.2"
As mentioned earlier, in 1989 the Supreme Court in City of Rich-
mond v. J. A. Croson Co.29 struck down a minority business enterprise
requirement enacted by the City of Richmond requiring prime contrac-
tors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty
27. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
28. Id. at 675-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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percent of the dollar amount to one or more minority business enter-
prises. Although this case is only indirectly related to affirmative action
in employment, its Olympian pronouncements potentially affect almost
all affirmative action programs. For the first time, a Supreme Court
majority specifically adopts the strict scrutiny standard for any state
mandated plan requiring classification by race. Strict scrutiny requires
that a state or local government program that classifies individuals on
the basis of race may do so only if the classification is justified by a
compelling state interest and the means employed are narrowly tailored
to effect that interest.30
While the Supreme Court concluded that as a matter of state law
the City of Richmond had requisite authority to use its spending pow-
ers to deal with the discrimination, it held that the city had not estab-
lished a sufficient factual predicate of past discrimination to authorize
race-based relief under the Fourteenth Amendment. There was also
discussion, at least in a plurality, that the plan was not sufficiently nar-
rowly tailored because it did not reflect a determination that race neu-
tral or less intrusive alternatives were unavailing.
In its most recent affirmative action case, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC"1 the Court seems to have adopted a different level of scru-
tiny for those affirmative action programs that are mandated by an act
of Congress. The Court held,
[B]enign race conscious measures mandated by Congress - even if
those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to
compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination -
are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives.
32
The Court seemed to rely on Fullilove to justify utilizing this midlevel
scrutiny. Also relied upon to make this distinction is the fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment, Clause 5, gives Congress authority to effectu-
ate the purposes of the Amendment, and states are given no such au-
thority. Again there were dissents, and importantly, the dissents would
have applied strict scrutiny to the act of Congress just as was applied
in the case of state action in Croson.
This issue has not yet been laid to rest. I fear the cases in the
30. Id. at 472.
31. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
32. Id. at 3008-09.
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pipeline will bring this matter back to the Supreme Court for yet an-
other go. Justices Brennan and Marshall, in the majority in Metro, re-
tired. Justice Souter's views are not known, and Justice Thomas is a
declared foe of affirmative action.
B. Affirmative Action as Remedy in the Supreme Court
The second context in which the constitutionality of affirmative ac-
tion has been addressed in the Supreme Court has been those cases in
which the remedy, either by consent decree or by order of the court,
has included goals and timetables based on race or sex.
Although in one sense all affirmative action programs are remedial
in purpose in that they attempt to deal with a problem, the second
context involves remedy post-adjudication. Therein lies the essential
difference. On the one hand, the parties have joined issue in the court
and, either by conceding defeat or adjudication of guilt, the party sub-
ject to the act has a penalty imposed. The fact that the penalty may be
for the benefit of persons who have not yet arrived on the scene and
could not be identified as victims in the usual tort sense, which is con-
sidered prospective relief for the benefit of a third party, is nothing new
in our jurisprudence. In fact, most injunctive mandates operate in the
future.
The Department of Justice in the Reagan-Bush Administration
took the position before the Supreme Court that even injunctive relief
was restricted to identified victims of discrimination and that under Ti-
tle VII, prospective relief would not lie. The Court has rejected that
"crabbed" reading of the remedy provision of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (and its own dicta in a previous case);33 however,
the number of dissenters on the issue clouds the continued validity of
the principle.
The principle cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed af-
firmative action as remedy are Local 93, International Ass'n of Fire
Fighters v. City of Cleveland,3" Local 28 of the Sheetmetal Workers'
International Ass'n v. EEOC,3 5 and United States v. Paradise.6
The Local 93 case involved a challenge to the legality of an affirm-
ative action consent decree that provided hiring preferences to black
33. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
34. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
35. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
36. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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fire fighters who were not actual victims of the city's discriminatory
practices. The Supreme Court concluded that whatever limits might be
involved in section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which sets forth the remedial authority of the federal court, those limits
were not implicated in a voluntary agreement as it determined the con-
sent decree to be.
In Local 28 of the Sheetmetal Workers' International Ass'n v.
EEOC, the Court clearly rejected the U.S. Department of Justice's
strained interpretation of the scope of the statute by concluding that
district courts have the power to order affirmative, race-conscious relief
when necessary to counteract egregious discrimination.3 7 This case in-
volved a union that had been cited for discrimination as early as 1964.
It was ultimately found to be in contempt of federal court and placed
under the jurisdiction of an administrator to carry out the goals of the
affirmative action program which had been imposed upon it. The pro-
gram sought to establish a nonwhite membership of twenty-nine per-
cent in this sheetmetal local. The majority determined that the mem-
bership goal which was part of the remedy the lower court imposed was
subject to examination regarding its permissibility under the equal pro-
tection component of the Fifth Amendment. It also concluded that the
requirements necessary for affirmance had been met. This case too is
replete with a multiplicity of opinions, perhaps the critical one being
Justice O'Connor's, who considered the membership requirement to be
an unjustified quota under the statute and takes pains to detail the dif-
ference between acceptable goals and timetables and a quota.
United States v. Paradise involved an affirmative action remedy
after adjudication of discrimination in an egregious situation. In litiga-
tion extending back as far as 1972, the Department of Public Safety of
the State of Alabama had been repeatedly found guilty of discrimina-
tion against blacks. After many attempts to obtain compliance and nu-
merous consent decrees, the case finally reached the Supreme Court on
the constitutionality of the remedy. The district court had required the
Department to hire one black trooper for each white trooper until
blacks constituted approximately twenty-five percent of the staff. Of
significance in the case was whether the court had the power to order
the hiring relief and whether the one black-one white promotion
scheme was permissible under the equal protection guarantee of the
Constitution. Again, the U.S. Department of'Justice intervened, main-
37. Local 28, 478 U.S. at 447-48.
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taining that race-conscious relief ordered in the case violated the Con-
stitution. Again the Supreme Court rejected this position. It also re-
jected the government's attempt to show that even if the conduct
provided a compelling state interest the relief was not sufficiently nar-
rowly tailored to meet the standards that the Court had previously en-
dorsed. Again there were dissents. This time O'Connor, Scalia, and
Rehnquist objected that the district court did not consider available
alternatives in fashioning relief; and therefore, it was not acting con-
sistently with the strict scrutiny standard requirement that relief be
narrowly tailored. If the facts of Local 28 and Paradise don't justify
the most far-reaching remedy, it is hard to imagine what facts would
satisfy the dissenters.
III. WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
MAJORITY OF THE SITTING COURT DOES NOT WITHSTAND
"STRICT SCRUTINY"
In my opinion, the Supreme Court's performance in the employ-
ment discrimination area over the last decade has been nothing short of
shameful. The Justices have engaged in almost spiteful, ideological
bickering, treating us to a multiplicity of excessively long concurring
and dissenting opinions, and leaving the bar and the bench below fre-
quently less well served by the Court having decided a case than we
would have been if they left the matter to the warring views of the
appellate courts.
On the one hand, I suppose, taking a cynical view, lawyers should
react with glee. It being virtually impossible to get any clear guidance
from the cases, clients can be scared out of their bloody wits by the
uncertainty. And the legal fees charged as a result thereof can continue
to skyrocket. For those of us in academia, especially those of us who
occasionally produce teaching materials for the legal community, the
task of editing voluminous cases and dissents is a daunting one. Despite
our best efforts to shorten them, they keep expanding and it drives the
cost of the casebooks ever higher - as well as the length of
assignments.
I would like to suggest to the incoming President that he get a bill
introduced in Congress that requires all sit-down desks to be removed
from the judges' chambers. They must stand up and write their own
opinions and dissents and provide them no law clerks. Perhaps we
should even require they write them out by longhand on yellow pages. I
can guarantee you that the length of the opinions would be drastically
376 [Vol. 15:361
ALTHEIMER LECTURE
reduced by such measures.
The Chief Justice has disclaimed any responsibility in the Court to
provide us with clear guidance:
Justice Brennan's dissent takes us to task for "tend[ing] merely
to obfuscate, rather than inform, our understanding of the meaning of
rights under the law. . . . Were this Court constituted to operate a
national classroom on "the meaning of rights" for the benefit of inter-
ested litigants, this criticism would carry weight. 8
With due respect to the Justice's view, I submit that it is the obli-
gation and duty of the Court to resolve disputes not create greater ones,
and to consider what is necessary and useful to help maintain peace
and tranquillity in the country. I also would suggest that in the interest
of collegiality the Justices should put aside their ideological stances. I
fear that the very integrity of the Supreme Court and of the entire
judicial process is at risk."9 It is increasingly difficult to convince new
generations of law students that the process is driven by the search for
truth and justice and marked by practices conducted with integrity.
Some members of the Court still insist that the United States
Constitution is color-blind. There can be no fair reading of history that
would support such a proposition. The United States Constitution was
itself crafted in such a way that guaranteed the southern states would
remain in the federation by enabling them to continue slavery and to
count at least two-thirds of a slave for purposes of determining the
state's representation in the Congress of the United States. It is true,
however, that the founding fathers did not use the word blacks or Ne-
groes in the original documents, although they did refer specifically to
Indians. I cite the Supreme Court of the United States in Dred Scott v.
Sanford0 as authority for the real color of the United States Constitu-
tion. Moreover, I cite the Civil Rights Cases,"' and Plessy v. Fergu-
son,'2 to help my listeners appreciate the long-standing color taint in
the United States Constitution. 3
38. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476 n.13 (1982).
39. And I cite as illustrations academic movements such as the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment, the feminist movements, and the critical race theorists. All of these movements project
suspicion, some bordering on disrespect, of the bona fides of the judicial process.
40. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
41. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
42. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
43. For some enlightenment on the myth, see generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 'Our
Constitution is Color Blind', 44 STAN. L. REV. I (1991); DONALD E. LIVELY. THE CONSTITUTION
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Despite the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not un-
til the Warren Court formulated broad antidiscrimination principles
that the nation began to move toward a democracy in which people of
color were even theoretically allowed to participate equally. The march
of statutory enactments at the national level, beginning with the 1964
Civil Rights Act and continuing until today, (as well as at the state and
local levels) are driven by politics much less than by ideology or philos-
ophy. Affirmative action has become a political football, and code
words like "law and order," "crime in the streets," and even "family
values and welfare" are laden with racist overtones. It is disingenuous
for a majority of the Court to hide behind myths of a color-blind con-
stitution to justify prohibiting state and local governments, and severely
limit the federal government, in their effort aggressively to deal with
the deprivations which come from racial discrimination - directly and
indirectly. For centuries in this country, discrimination by law and in
fact was directed at groups. Restricting remedial efforts to individual
victims denies to society an adequate tool to "get beyond racism."
It is disingenuous for the Court to intone "strict scrutiny" as a
justification for frustrating these modest efforts as if strict scrutiny
were invented on the mountain and etched on the tablets of stone which
Moses allegedly brought down. Or at the very least written on the back
of the parchment but which the founding fathers somehow forgot to
include in the document which the Court claims to be "color-blind." Or
if not that, perhaps it's written somewhere on the back of the Four-
teenth Amendment or the Thirteenth or the Fifteenth, where?
The fact of the matter is that it comes from a footnote in a 1938
Supreme Court case which had nothing at all to do with invidious dis-
crimination based on race or other such considerations. In United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,"' a case involving regulation of filled
milk products, Justice Stone, a former law professor, posed some limits
on judicial review as a way to slow the Court's overreaching in striking
down various economic regulations. To maintain the role of the Court
in intervening when governments were abusing "discrete and insular
minorities," the Justice posed a higher level of scrutiny to justify the
continuance of programs directed against minority groups and funda-
mental rights.
AND RACE (1992).
44. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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It was not until 1942 that this case was ever referenced."5 Ironi-
cally, in the Japanese internment case,46 lip service was given to the
strict scrutiny standard and compelling interest found and the constitu-
tionality of the government's program sustained. Years later we have
found out that there was no such compelling interest and reparation
efforts were made through an act of Congress.
It seems that this Supreme Court has set its face against civil
rights advancement, as well as other advancements that protect individ-
uals against state overreaching. It is not for want of alternative respect-
able jurisprudence, but rather it seems the Court is bent on acting out
its version of constitutional protections in a diverse democracy.
On the race based benign program efforts of state and local gov-
ernments, just as a professor "invented" strict scrutiny in the first in-
stance back in the 1930s, professors have tendered a sliding scrutiny
standard to the Court at least for the last fifteen years. Rejecting the
effort to make sex a suspect class, the Court has adopted the sliding
scale of scrutiny in gender discrimination cases."7 In fact, a majority of
the Court in Metro indorsed it in a race case involving affirmative ac-
tion by the federal government. 8 A relaxed standard of scrutiny would
be a perfectly respectable jurisprudential choice to permit states to help
eliminate problems which they helped to create over the last 400 years.
It is not just that the current jurisprudence puts a cloud on what
the state and local governments can do, it clouds the whole area of
affirmative action by the private entrepreneur. Leading representatives
of corporate America have realized that our future depends on effective
and efficient utilization of all of our human resources. The demo-
graphic projections suggest there will be a majority of nonwhites and
females in the workforce in the not too distant future. The government,
however, led by an ideologically fixated emerging Court majority, is
busy crafting legal constructs which will make it difficult if not impos-
sible for employers to meet the future challenges. It is also apparent
that the employers cannot do it alone, as our entire system of education
will need to be altered to reflect the impending demographic shifts.
45. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, J., concurring).
46. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) Cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
47. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972).
48. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, I10 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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IV. DEMOGRAPHICS ARE DESTINY
The only resource a nation has of substantial dependability is the
creative energies of its people. Any program or initiative that in fact
contributes to or exacerbates the waste of human resources should be
discontinued. Given the demographics as they are portrayed to us, and
even factoring in a fairly substantial margin of error, we may already
be too late to avoid a crisis by the year 2000. Each year we fail to
educate and train that year's crop of young people adds to the stream
of the unprepared being spilled into the population. I say spilled into
the population because if they are unprepared there will be little room
for them in the workforce. Each year we stifle the aspirations of those
who enter the workforce, the aspirations for meaningful participation,
we not only underutilize their talents but send a message of futility to
those who are waiting in the wings. The Supreme Court's madness in
suggesting in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education that the estab-
lishment of role models is not a compelling government interest is more
counterproductive than its claim that, rather than obey the law which
prohibits invalid tests which do not predict job success, employers will
violate the law by resorting to quotas.
While affirmative action in employment in the past generation
might have been a morality play, efficient utilization of our human re-
sources for tomorrow is a matter of economic survival. If we are not to
become a third world nation in the near term, we must address the
demographic realities. Ideological posturing about a color-blind United
States Constitution that never existed will not deal with the fact that
before too long the majority of the participants in the workforce will be
women and minorities. Unless we are going to replicate a society like
South Africa's where the best jobs are reserved for a precious few, a
society they are painfully dismantling, we had best be about equipping
all our people to take their places in the productive side of our eco-
nomic, social, and political activities. Tomorrow may be too late. The
crisis is now!
Teaching is the most optimistic of professions. The product is in
the projection of knowledge into the future through our students. It is
impossible to teach effectively if all we project is gloom and doom. Last
fall the people of this nation sent a most powerful message on the issue
of diversity. There are more women, blacks, and other people of color
in the Congress than ever before in this nation's history. For the first
time, there is a black woman and a Native American man in the
United States Senate. Although they are less than their proportion of
[Vol. 15:361
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the population by far, as women and minorities constitute the majority
of our people, the increase in their participation in the face of twelve
years of benign neglect, if not malignant opposition from the govern-
ment, seems a clear message from the people that diversity is the fu-
ture. The election of Governor Clinton and Senator Gore, who ran on a
campaign theme of bringing all our people together, is rejection of gov-
ernment by division and exclusion. We have reason for renewed opti-
mism and hope. I believe "together we can do it."

